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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0), as
amended.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented to this Court for review:
ISSUE NO. 1:

Did the district court err in ruling that Oregon law would apply a

"presumption of payment" to the savings account at issue?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's interpretation of binding case law is a
question of law reviewed for correctness. Christiansen v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 2005 UT
21, If 7,116 P.3d 259.
PRESERVATION:

This issue was argued in connection with the defendant's

motion for summary judgment, R. 81-89, 99-109, 129-130, and at trial, T. 87-89.
ISSUE NO. 2:

In the alternative, did the district court err in ruling that, if the

presumption of payment rule does apply, the plaintiffs evidence did not rebut the
presumption?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Under Oregon law, "[a] rebuttable presumption is one
that may be overcome if the party against whom the presumption is directed submits
probative evidence that the nonexistence of its presumed fact is more probable than its
existence." Redler v. Redler, 330 Or. 51, 996 P.2d 963, 968 (2000). Because the Bank
offered no contrary evidence as to the disposition of the bank account at issue, this Court's
review is not a comparison or weighing of the evidence, or a review of findings of fact
based upon such a comparison. Rather, the issue for review is whether the plaintiff adduced
1

sufficient evidence to overcome an evidentiary presumption implied by law. That is
analogous to the review of a trial court's finding that evidence is insufficient to go to a jury.
Accordingly, the decision should be reviewed de novo. Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, f 8,
116P.3d290.
PRESERVATION:

This issue was argued in connection with the defendant's

motion for summary judgment, R. 81, 99-102, 129-134, and at trial, T. 85-88, 161-168, 180181.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
There are no dispositive constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Plaintiff George B. Handy brought this action on March 8, 2004, to recover money
in a savings account opened by defendant U. S. Bank's predecessor. (R. 1.) On June 24,
2005, U. S. Bank filed a motion with summary judgment, arguing that the claims were
barred by the "presumption of payment" doctrine, laches, and Oregon's Uniform
Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (escheatment statute). (R. 75.) Plaintiff filed an
opposing memorandum (R. 93), and the Bank filed a reply. (R. 124.)
The trial court heard oral argument on August 24, 2005, and issued a
Memorandum Decision on September 7, 2005, denying U. S. Bank's motion. (R. 148149.) The Bank asserted, and the court agreed, that Oregon law should be applied to the
dispute because the passbook was issued by an Oregon bank. (R. 81, 149; see also R. 263
13.)
2

The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment with respect to the
rebuttable presumption of presumption, ruling that "the Plaintiffs evidence is sufficient
to overcome a presumption of payment." (R. 150.) It further denied the motion based
upon laches, concluding that "[w]hether the plaintiff had full knowledge of the passbook
as well as whether it was the Plaintiffs delay that prejudiced the Defendant are questions
for the trier of fact." (R. 151 and id ("Whether the prejudice to the Defendant was
caused by Plaintiffs delay or through Defendant's own actions is a factual question")).
With respect to the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, the trial court
held that "[t]he fact of whether the account escheated remains in issue." (R. 152.)
The case was tried to the bench on February 6, 2006. (R. 230.) At the conclusion
of the trial, the court noted that the facts of the case were basically not in dispute. (T.
159, lines 16-22.) The dispositive issue, therefore, became burdens of proof and an
evidentiary presumption.

The court took the matter under advisement, and issued a

Memorandum Decision on March 7, 2006. (R. 248.)
The trial court found that the Bank had not adduced sufficient evidence to prove
the affirmative defense that the funds had escheated to the state, noting: "The only
evidence at trial was that this account did not escheat to either Oregon or Utah." (R. 249.)
The court also found that the Bank had not met its burden of proving the affirmative
defense of laches, stating: "The Defendant had the burden to establish, if possible, some
fact or circumstance that would have placed Mr. Handy on constructive notice that the
funds were being threatened sooner than October, 2003. Defendant has not made that
required showing." (R. 250.)
3

The trial court's final ruling was the basis for entering judgment in favor of the
defendant. The court ruled that, under Oregon law, "[a]fter twenty years, an obligation is
presumed to have been paid," and that "[t]he presumption of payment from lapse of time
applies to bank deposits." (R. 250; see also R. 261,ffl]3-4.) The court measured the
twenty-year period from the date of the initial deposits (1971), and therefore concluded
that "a period of 32 years" had lapsed. Accordingly, the court presumed that the deposits
had been paid, and shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiff. (R. 250.)
The trial court stated that the presumption of payment "is a strong one and the
evidence to rebut it must be satisfactory and convincing." (R. 251.) The court then
summarized the plaintiffs evidence as follows, finding it insufficient:
[T]he passbook shows the deposits and expressly states that withdrawals require
presentation of the passbook. "George B. Handy, Trustee" is the only name
appearing on the passbook. Mr. Handy has not made any withdrawals and has not
authorized any other person to make withdrawals. There is no other competent
evidence that these deposits have not been paid.
Statement of Facts
As the trial court noted, the facts in this case were not in dispute. (T. 159.) Out of
the various facts, however, one single fact is dispositive of this appeal: Mr. Handy first
made demand for payment of the savings account in 2003. (R. 260.) Under Oregon law,
the twenty-year period required to invoke a presumption of payment did not begin to run
until that date, if it applied at all. (See pp. 17-18, infra.) All other facts are immaterial to
the disposition of the case. However, to provide an overall picture of the events, the
evidence at trial included the following:

4

Plaintiff George B. llandv. l.su., has practiced law in the Ogden area for fiftyseven years.
puNNbunk
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Iht passbook was under the name "George B.

Handy, Trustee," Account No, 403111-8, and was issued in 1971 by the Portland branch
ofthe United States National Bank of Oregon. ( I n a l l ' x h . I Addendum Iwl1,

i

I IK1 passbth4 shows lh< I-vllowiiu1 *li:posits: , •.--..

••'.-..

July 29, 1971

$50,000

>.. August 9,
':,,,.

Aunusl

' $2? • 0'
I •

•'

August 23, 1971
.

September -

$25,000
$25,000

1 .

$25,01111

Mr. Handy was unaware that the passbook was in his possession, and did not know
how he came to bi in possessmn

mil im iill n n seeing the passbook InTnie.

( 1 . 1142, lines 3-21; R. 259,ffl[940.) As he puzzled over it, Mr. Handy recalled a client
for whom he was providing legal services in 10" i.

r

idiard A. Anders** i. .\;; Anderson

•*••»* n» * t -M y\

%*-,

• * -Hfc ea faka I>epCo).

In 1971, He was in the midst of legal disputes in several states, including Oregon, and Mr.
Handy had traveled with him u> Oregon u> discuss his business i^uc:
there

u

o i ,s

I Illii I land ' itrallnl liuil ;il ainiind lli.it same 1inu\ Mr. Anderson asked if he could

place money in a trust account in Mr. Handy's name. \T TTamh staled that he had no
objection. (See T. 28-33, 40.)

'

'
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On January 2, 1972, three and a half months after the last deposit in Account
403111-8, Richard Anderson died in a plane crash. (T. 32-33, lines 24-9.) Mr. Handy
feels an obligation to collect the money in the account, and to attempt to return it to the
person(s) he believes to be its rightful owner(s). He does not seek to gain personally from
this lawsuit. (T. 33, lines 10-18; T. 44-45, lines 20-11.)
In 1997, the U.S. National Bank of Oregon merged with First Bank National
Association, ultimately resulting in the formation of an entity called U. S. Bank National
Association, the named defendant in this action. (T. 16-17, lines 19-12; T. 34, lines 6-8.)
Except where otherwise noted, U. S. Bank and its predecessors are collectively referred to
herein as "the Bank."
A bank passbook was a small book that constituted a customer's only record of his
or her deposit account. (See pp. 12-16, infra.) Customers would present the book to the
bank to be updated when conducting transactions, such as deposits or withdrawals. (T.
91-92, lines 25-10.)

The Passbook states, under the heading "About Your Savings

Account":
For your protection, all withdrawals from this account require presentation of this
passbook. Please notify us at once should you lose your passbook.
*

*

*

It is not necessary to bring in your passbook on the first of each quarter for the
entry of interest. We credit your account automatically with your interest on these
dates and it can be entered in your passbook at any time thereafter.
Addendum Exh. A, cover.
Under "Rules and Regulations Governing Savings Accounts," the Passbook states:

6

(1111: SAVINGS PASSBOOK)
Rule 2. A pre-numbered passbook shall be issued for each sax
\ \u
deposits made by or for the account of the depositor will b
,u in the
passbook at the time they are made, or as soon thereafter as the j
>k shall be
presented for such purpose. The balance shown in the passbook to the credit of the
depositor is subject to correction to accord with the Bank's records.
Should the savings passbook be lost, destroyed or fraudulently obtained from any
depositor, immediate notice must be given the office of the Bank at which the
account is carried. After such notice, if satisfactory explanation be made and bond
of indemnity be given in a form approved by the Bank's officers, the amount to the
credit of the depositor will be paid to such depositor or a new K *k x\ ill be issued
therefor.
*

*

*

'

•

•

•

(WITHDRAWALS)
Rule 6. The passbook must be presented to the Bank \\ hen a i\ ltbilruvv i' "s "IKHJI
Withdrawals may be made personally, the depositor being required to sign a
receipt for the amount of the withdrawal, or by order in writing satisfactorily
authenticated, or by power of attorney, duly authenticated.
M , second and llmil I iiiiiiiimlu'inl I irnr

_

.• . •

.

Upon discovering the passbook, M r . Ilandv promptly contacted the Bank. T h e
Bank did not dispute the authenticity oi the passbouk. and ^ k n o w l e d g e s that it is a record
•^ •-*••

Nonetheless, it refused Mr. Handy's

demand for payment of the balance shown in the passbook plus accumulated interest.
Handy never made any wilhduwals, ncvci a u l h o n / a l air me \ IM "'

i.ake

withdrawals, never signed an aflidin if oi a lost passbook, and never received any money
from the account. ( 1 . 26-27, lines 19-8; R. 1 "" N; .-Mthouuh it was possible for someone
to make a withdrawal without a passDcuw UIAICI ^oiiic >,.• . . <MW^
7

-

*>. - • -• 2,

T. 123-124, lines 13-7) (at least as of 1980, when the Bank's trial witnesses became
employed there), it was not common. (T. 123, lines 9-18.)1 Additionally, if more than
one person had been an authorized signer on the account, both names ordinarily would
have appeared on the passbook itself. (T. 119-121, lines 8-4.)
Beginning in 1980, the Bank decided to discontinue offering passbook accounts,
and instead to offer only "statement accounts," for which customers would receive
regular statements of their account. (T. 91, lines 18-24.) Mr. Handy never received any
notice of the change, or any statements on the account. (T. 27-28, lines 16-7.)
As far as the Bank's witnesses knew (they did not become employed at the Bank
until years later), the Bank began to computerize its records in 1974. (T. 95, lines 3-5.)2
Data regarding an account's ownership, address, social security numbers, and balances
were fully computerized by 1980. Records were also maintained on microfiche. (T. 91,
lines 11-17.)
The Bank elected not to retain any records relating to the Account. There was no
requirement that the records be destroyed after a particular period of time; it was solely

The Bank's witness did not know what the Bank's policy was with respect to
restrictions on withdrawals without a passbook (whether there was a dollar limit, whether
an account could be closed out entirely without a passbook, etc.). (T. 124-125, lines 3-8.)
The Bank did not call any witnesses who worked at the Bank when the deposits were
made. The Bank's two trial witnesses were hired in 1980, nine years after the account
was opened. (T. 90-91, lines 21-2; T. 127-128, lines 12-3.) The other Bank witness who
testified never worked at the Oregon bank. (T. 73, lines 4-7.) The Bank made no effort
to investigate which bank employees' initials appeared in the passbook, or to call them as
witnesses. (T. 79, lines 2-24; T. 103-104, lines 2-18.)
8

the Bank's decision to do so. (R. 71, ffi[ 8-10, R. 7(.\ 1 ' 11\ lines I" 18.) The Bank
acknowledges that, •without such records, there is no way to prove that the account was
ever paid uui HI

I i|| I I

At trial, the Bank acknowledged that it had no evidence thai A count 4 0 ? ] ' I ?
had been converted to a statement account, or that the monex in (he . .^couni ...

, cr

i ) Instead, the
Bank relied entirely upon a twenty-year "presumption of payment," whu «i would shift the
defendant's normal burden nl prooi on die atunnaiivc J c k ; , . c ofpayme*
uui

,5.

; : "!*

, ,

..UI:H1L

Imntiff has failed to meet its

burden of proof, specificalh with the presumption of payment rule that is applicable and
relevant in the Stau <»i Oregon and- aju.i.. di.u ,u.„ M.II.
presi -. •
22) (Cour*

'

•

• '

I

'ocs bevond ?() vears . . . .

T. 89, lines 20-

- \ oil"- reiving upon strict!) \Uc Oregon law that says: Hey. after 20 years,

no activity, if s presumes ... ; *. ,
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Savings accounts are unique U- the banking industry. With the encouragement of
banks, customers oilen kit u

JIIOIU1'. H

savings accnunl

I i nmn\ \c;n:

fully expecting

that it will be there when they eventually call for it. At the time that iAccount 403 111-8
was opened, the only record of such account that the bank customer would have receixed
mi! Ilie passhnnl, ill i 111 \\III111 IIIi \\n\ umsideied tiiinui tarn n

IIUIIIH

r nil Ihr status (if the

account - i.e., the transactions that had occurred. It was for that reason that presentation
of the passbook was expressly required before withdrawals could be made.
9

In the court below, the Bank acknowledged that it had no evidence of what
happened to Account 403111-8. It speculated that the account had been switched to a
statement account, but there was no record of that, and Mr. Handy had never received any
statements.

It speculated that someone else might have withdrawn the money, but

conceded that such an occurrence would have been unusual, and again there was no
evidence of it. Thus, Mr. Handy had prima facie evidence (the passbook) that the money
was owing, and the Bank had no contrary evidence. Ordinarily, therefore, Mr. Handy
would have been entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Bank's argument that, in the absence of actual evidence of payment, it was
nonetheless entitled to a presumption of payment is directly contradicted by Oregon
Supreme Court precedent. Under Oregon law, no presumption of payment period is
triggered until a debt has matured, and a cause of action against the defendant has
accrued. A cause of action against a bank on a deposit account, in turn, does not accrue
until the claimant has made a demand and the bank has refused to pay. Courts and
commentators are virtually unanimous on that point, noting that a bank has no obligation
to pay - i.e., the debt does not "mature" - until the plaintiff asks for the money at the
bank's place of business, unlike a traditional debtor, who has an obligation to track down
the creditor and pay the debt immediately.
The trial court thus erred in measuring the presumption of payment period from the
initial deposit in 1971, instead of the time of plaintiff s demand and the bank's refusal in
2003. Additionally, the trial court's application of the presumption of payment to savings

10

accounts is inconsistent with the Oregon Supreme Court's recognition that evidentiary
presumptions should only apply when it makes sense undci inc circumstances.

does not make sense to apply a presumption of payment to savings accounts, considering
that customers are encouraged and expected to leave money m them lor .:ideiiniLc periods
:

•.

u v o n k nn thereb1- make it

difficult to defend a claim, the consequences of thai decision lie with the bank.
1

x

-~c alternative, even o .\ presumption of paymen. ,._; ap, nee.
. ntilT*. rvii* ;>

-• ••

''tiiMrf •

-•!-.•

i

This issue does not involve

a weighing of evidence, kaiher, under Oregon law, the presumption "does not arise" at
all if evidence explaining the delay or supporting non-pa\ i..c•"'• '

T;

.vas uneontroverted that Mr. Handy never

made any withdrawals, nor authorized anyone e i ^
-.

**\*K

• ^session when bank iules vvould have required a io be

presented in order to make a withdrawn

off..M

;s .

.-

.- - ^.n.-.s

meone else might have withdrawn the money would have

been, according to the Bank's own witnesses, unusual.
In sum, the 111. i I i iKiiiiill i kail) urn il In • 111111 iiiiiii i pUMimpliim nl pa\ inrnl In a
savings account on which demand for payment was not made unt. 2

jed,

persuasive authority suggests that presumption* of payment shin.id i ot apply ai «ii to
depo

:. ' n

deeming the plaintiffs evidence insufficient to overcome the presumption under Oregon
law.

11

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT A PRESUMPTION
OF PAYMENT APPLIED TO THE SAVINGS ACCOUNT AT ISSUE.

A.

The presumption of payment is inapplicable in this case because the twenty-

year presumption period was not triggered until Mr. Handv's demand in 2003.
Savings accounts are "peculiar to [the] banking business." Nathan Newmark, The
Law Relating to Bank Deposits (1888); Michie on Banks and Banking (2002), § 308, p.
415 (noting "peculiarities" of the bank-depositor relationship). Unlike a typical debtorcreditor relationship, instead of owing money in the classic sense, a Bank is being
entrusted with money. The customer not only expects but desires that the bank retain the
money until the customer calls for it.
In Oregon, funds placed in a savings account are referred to as a "deposit liability."
Blakeley v. First National Bank of the Dalles, 151 Or. 655, 51 P.2d 1034, 1037, 1040
(1935). Depositors often leave money in savings accounts for many years, assuming that
it will be available to them when demand is eventually made. "A depositor of funds into
a bank savings account is entitled to believe that the deposit is entirely safe, that funds
will be indefinitely available, and that no demand need be made and no action need be
taken to protect the right to obtain those funds at any time the passbook is presented."
Michie, supra, at p. 416.
As one opinion cited by the Oregon Supreme Court stated rather colorfully:
When A. puts his money with B., a banker, he does it with the purpose of leaving it
there for a day, a year, or many years. It may be it is not put where moth and rust
do not corrupt and thieves do not break through and steal; but A. feels safe, as
things run in this world. He may go into a far country, up and down and to and
12

fro, resting on the assurance that his money will be his on his retui n; B. having the
• use, the interest, of it as his
Missouri

f'aciuc

t. < •• . i i)fUttu:nuu .\u!n~>tu4, iintik. _.

(1908^

•,.•-»

ir.K;ihl

(1943). See also Haines v. First National
(1918)

,

r,„7//(./.

; . . . ' . .

•'..'*.

_ 172 Or. 4 3 4 , 138 P.2d 613

Bank of Roseburg,

89 Or. 42, 172 P . 505

.• ?s common knowledge that individuals leave nionev on depnsil in hanks loi

long periods of time beyond the six years prescribed in which an action for money may be
instituted").
•. .

In this case, tl le Bank reinfoi ce d the expectation that no affin nati\ e act nee d 1:> z

taken to preserve funds by stating in its passbook that the customer did not have to come
"• \

receive interest or reconcile the account, unlike other banks wNch did require

of Baltimore, 132 A. 598 (Md. App. 1926) (passbook required the presentation of the
passbook at specific intervals for interest and balanci^^

during the interim:
With respect to a bank deposit, "[t]he transaction is in reality for the benefit and
convenience of the depositor, and while the relation of debtor and creditor exists,
and the bank has the use of the money for commercial gain, it assumes no further
obligation than to pay the amount received when it shall be demanded at its
banking house,"
Penagos v. Capital
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American Savings & Loan Assoc, 572 TN.l 2d 11 1 *\ 1118 Mil. App. \w* \ ("Si would not

be equitable to allow defendant to argue that demand must be made within a reasonable
time, because banks and savings and loans advertise to coax people to deposit money in a
savings account for their newborn child or grandchild. After people deposit their money
for their children, they leave the money in the account to accumulate interest until the
child is 18 or 20 years old and withdraws the money").
Viewing it practically, the longer the bank retains the money undisturbed, the
better it is for the bank. If it has been allowed to reap extraordinary gains from the
funds of a customer, because it has been allowed to retain them undisturbed for the
unwonted space of eight, ten, or twelve years, this would seem to be no just cause
for allowing it to add the still more enormous gain of a complete appropriation of
the whole sum. If the business of the institution is properly conducted, the
depositor's balance will remain for any period as an open and live credit on the
books of the bank; and therefore the depositor's draft for his principal, or any part
of it, could never operate as an injurious surprise, as a like demand might do
between individuals under ordinary circumstances. Such seems clearly to be the
fair reason of the matter. The legal arguments and authorities which sustain it
seem scarcely less than conclusive.
John T. Morse, Jr., A Treatise on the Law of Banks and Banking (5th Ed. 1917), § 292,
pp. 598-99.
In addition to the desire to leave money in a savings account for investment
purposes, banks were aware during the passbook era that savings accounts often became
dormant for long periods of time for other reasons. In 1970, for example, the general
counsel for the United States Savings and Loan League wrote:
Perhaps the majority of dormant accounts result from either the saver's
forgetfulness or the saver's death. It happens quite frequently, for example, that a
savings account holder forgets that he has an account at a particular association. A
move to another community, a change of office location (either his own or the
association's), loss or destruction of personal records, press of business, illness and
many other factors contribute to this forgetfulness, and thus a dormant account is
created. The second major factor contributing to dormancy is the death of a saver
and the failure of his estate representatives to locate his savings account.
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William C. Prather, Savings Accounts, American Savings and Loan Institute Press: 1970,
p. 542.
Account 403111-8 was the type of savings account known as a "passbook" savings
account. Such accounts "have become something of a dinosaur." Barkley Clark and
Barbara Clark, The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections and Credit Cards § 19.02[2][O].
However, from the earliest days of the banking industry until the mid-1980s, they were
the primary form of savings account in the United States. As a leading scholar in the
early twentieth century wrote, "The custom is probably universal in this country for every
depositor with a bank to have his bank-book, so called. In England the same thing is
called a 'passage-book' or 'pass-book.' It is hardly necessary to describe anything so
familiarly known." Morse, supra, at § 291, p. 548.
With passbook savings accounts, customers presented the passbook to the bank
when depositing or withdrawing funds. In contrast to the typical account of today, the
passbook was the customer's only record of the account; no statements of the account
were sent to passbook customers. See Clark, supra, § 19.02[2][P] (exception in federal
regulations for account statements on passbook accounts "is based on the theory that
consumers do not expect periodic statements for their passbook savings accounts").
For that reason, the passbook was considered to be primary evidence as to the state
of the customer's account:
It will be seen that the chief value of the book is that the depositor may have a
species of check upon the bank, and may use it as evidence upon the occurrence of
any dispute and lawsuit. The entries in the bank-book, made by the proper officer,
bind the bank as admissions. Especially the balancing of the book is conclusive
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upon the bank, in the same manner as an account stated. . . . It is prima facie
evidence against the bank, and binds it like any other form of acknowledgment or
receipt.
Morse, supra, at § 291(a), (b), pp. 548-59. See also Michie, supra, at § 309, p. 452 ("The
object of a passbook was to inform the depositor from time to time of the condition of his
account as it appeared upon the books of the bank. . . . It not only enabled him to discover
errors to his prejudice, but supplied evidence in his favor in the event of litigation or
dispute with the bank"); id. at pp. 455-56 (passbook constitutes "prima facie evidence that
the bank received the amount entered; that is, it raised a presumption that the deposit was
made. The passbook was prima facie evidence of the state of the depositor's account and
entries therein were admissible in evidence as to the amount due the depositor").
The trial court thus correctly concluded that possession of the passbook by Mr.
Handy was prima facie evidence that the sums in the account had been deposited and not
paid out. Ordinarily, that would have entitled Mr. Handy to judgment as a matter of law,
because the bank had no evidence that the account was actually paid, a defense on which
it bore the burden of proof under Oregon law. Kahl v. Pool, 47 Or.App. 43, 613 P.2d
1078, 1081 (1980) ("Payment must be pleaded and proved by the party claiming it"),
citing Pickett v. Pickett, 21A Or. 135, 544 P.2d 1042, 1043 (1976).
In this case, however, the Bank argued that it was entitled to a presumption of
payment due to the passage of time. Under the common law, payment of a debt will be
presumed after twenty years, in the absence of evidence explaining the delay. Beekman v.
Hamlin, 20 Or. 352, 25 P. 672 (1891) (Beekman II). The underlying rationale for the
presumption is that "a person naturally desires to possess and enjoy his own, and that an
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unexplained neglect to enforce an alleged right for a long period casts suspicion upon the
existence of the right itself." Id. at 672.
In Oregon, the presumption of payment is an evidentiary tool that shifts the normal
burden of proof from the defendant to the plaintiff. The Oregon Supreme Court has
explained:
The effect of the presumption of payment, arising from lapse of time, is to change
the burden of proof from the debtor to the creditor. Within 20 years, the law
presumes that the debt has remained unpaid, and the burden is on the debtor to
prove payment, but after 20 years, "the creditor is bound to show by something
more than his bond that the debt has not been paid; and this he may do, because the
presumption raises only a prima facie case against him."
Id. (citation omitted).
The twenty-year presumption of payment period does not begin to run until a debt
has matured and a cause of action against the debtor has arisen. Thompson v. Larsen, 118
Or. 421, 247 P. 139, 140 (1926) (measuring period of time for presumption of payment
from when "the cause of action accrued"); Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Or. 383, 24 P. 195,
195-96 (1890) (Beekman I) (the "common law presumption of payment attaches from the
time when the cause of action arises . . . ."). See also 70 C.J.S. Payment § 86
(presumption of payment applies to "a period of 20 years after maturity of a debt . . .
Ordinarily, the period necessary to raise a presumption of payment from lapse of time
does not begin to run until the debt is mature and a cause of action has therefore
accrued"); Henry J. Bailey & Richard B. Hagedorn, Brady on Bank Checks § 15.14
(common-law presumption is that payment was made "if more than twenty years have
passed since the debt matured").
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The Oregon Supreme Court has consistently held that a cause of action against a
bank on a deposit account does not accrue until demand for payment has been made and
refused. See First National Bank of Portland v. Connolly, 172 Or. 434, 138 P.2d 613
(1943) ("if a deposit is general and not evidenced by any regular certificate of deposit or
other writing fixing the time of payment, the statute of limitations does not commence to
run in favor of the bank until demand and refusal"), citing 5 Michie, Banks and Banking
679, § 354, Blakeley v. First National Bank of the Dalles, 151 Or. 655, 51 P.2d 1034,
1037, 1040 (1935), Haines v. First National Bank of Roseburg, 89 Or. 42, 172 P. 505,
508 (1918), and Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Continental National Bank, 212 Mo. 505, 111
S.W. 574(1908).3
Because a cause of action does not accrue against a bank on a deposit account until
demand has been made and refused, the twenty-year period required to impose a
presumption of payment did not begin to run in this case until 2003, when Mr. Handy first
demanded payment of the account. Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to shift the
burden of proof from the defendant to the plaintiff, and, in the absence of any evidence of
payment, plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

3

It is not coincidental that the triggering event for the presumption of payment period and
the statute of limitations is the same (accrual of a cause of action). "Historically, the
rebuttable presumption of payment originated in equity by analogy to the English statute
of limitations as early as the statute of Henry VIII, C.F. (1540), and was later made part of
the common law." Pagano v. United Jersey Bank, 143 N.J. 220, 760 A2d 509, 511
(1996).
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This basic principle is made clear by the Missouri Pacific case that was cited by
the Oregon Supreme Court in Connolly. In Missouri Pacific, the Missouri Supreme Court
conducted a thorough (and pithy) analysis of when a cause of action accrues against a
bank on a deposit account. Lacking precedent in its own state, the court turned to "the
inherent reason of the thing and the persuasive authority of precedents in other
jurisdictions establishing the general law." Id. at 577.
The Missouri Supreme Court first noted that it is error for a court to operate under
the assumption that the bank-depositor relationship is like a typical debtor-creditor
relationship:
Courts are fond of saying that the relation between depositor and banker is merely
that of debtor and creditor. If that formula precisely expressed all there was of the
truth, then the statute of limitations would be applied to the relation of depositor
and banker precisely as it is between debtor and creditor. But the formula may be
said to be somewhat of a fiction of the law—a formula used for want of a better
and springing from the poverty of our language in expressing nice shades of
thought. It is the truth, but not all there is of it. For example, a bank is sometimes
viewed as a mere custodian of the depositor's fund; so it is trite learning that a
bank is under no obligation to pay until demand made.
Id. (citations omitted).
Application of ordinary debtor-creditor principles is not appropriate in the context
of a bank's liability on a deposit, the court wrote, because a bank is not a debtor in the
ordinary sense:
It need not like a common debtor, run about and hunt up its creditor, and pay him
whenever and wherever found. To the contrary (Mahomet going to the mountain)
it pays only over its counter. The deposit, then, not being due till demand is made,
the demand and refusal to pay set the statute running....
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The notion that a depositor could lose his money due to the passage of time before
a demand had even been made has been anathema since long before our present system of
laws, the court wrote:
Was it not shrewdly said in very olden time: "Wherefore then gavest not thou my
money into the bank, that at my coming I might have required mine own," etc?
Luke, 19:23, q. v. But would it not be a startling and far reaching proposition to
announce that B., the banker, has not only the usufruct of, but by the mere flux of
time has absorbed, the very corpus of A.'s deposit; thus bringing B. within the
description of the austere man, of whom it was said in the authority, supra: "Thou
takest up that thou layedst not down, and reapest that thou didst not sow"? The
fact that no case involving that proposition is in our reports may well be due to the
consensus of opinion in the business world that the proposition runs counter to
good banking and the good sense of the thing.
/</. at578.
The court then turned to a leading treatise on bank law, Morse on Banks and
Banking, which observed that, when money is deposited into an account, an implied
contract arises "modified by the clear legal understanding that the money shall be
forthcoming to meet the order of the creditor whenever that order shall be properly
presented for payment." Id., quoting Morse, supra, at § 322. It follows, Morse stated,
"that this demand for payment is an integral and essential part of the undertaking, and it
may be said even of the debt itself." Id.
In short, the agreement of the bank with the depositor, as distinct and valid as if
written and executed under the seal of each of the parties, is only to pay upon
demand. Accordingly, until there has been such demand, and a refusal thereto, or
until some act of the depositor, or some act of the bank made known to the
depositor, has dispensed with such demand and refusal, the statute ought not to
begin to run, nor should any presumption of payment be allowed to arise.
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 578 ("'[The bank] becomes a mere custodian, and is
not in default or liable to respond in damages until demand has been made and payment
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refused. . . . Hence it follows that no right of action exists, and the statute of limitations
does not begin to run until the demand stipulated for in the contract has been duly made.
For this authorities are hardly necessary.' The great weight of authority runs the same
way") (citations omitted).
The Oregon Supreme Court has made the same observation, stating: "The relation
of a bank and its depositor is that of an ordinary debtor and creditor, except that by
custom the bank is only liable upon demand made at its place of business." Nodine v.
First National Bank of Union, 41 Or. 386, 68 P. 1109, 1111 (1902) (emphasis added).
See also 10 Am.Jur.2d Banks and Financial Institutions § 769 ("[A] contract arises from
implication of law from a general deposit of funds in a bank that the bank will, whenever
properly demanded, pay the funds in such sums and to such persons as the depositor shall
direct and designate") (emphasis added).
In sum:
For debt though it be of the bank to the depositor, it is not such naked debt that it
can be sued upon by the depositor at any moment. The authorities are numerous
and overwhelming that the depositor's right of action does not come into existence
until after he has made a demand upon the bank, which there was an implied and
valid understanding between them in the outset that he should make . . . . The
duties of demand and of payment are reciprocal. Surely then the legal results of
these rights should be reciprocal likewise. If the depositor cannot sue till he has
demanded payment, e converso he should not lose his right to sue till the payment
has been refused; for until that time he has a right to suppose that the original
agreement between himself and the bank, which was entered into for their mutual
advantage and profit, and from which his refraining from demand is enabling the
bank to reap an unusually great advantage and large profit, is still subsisting in
unbroken force.
Morse, § 322(e), pp. 601-02. See also Penagos, supra, 766 So.2d at 1090-91 ("clear
majority view" that cause of action does not arise on deposit accounts until demand); Arlt,
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supra, 572 N.E.2d at 1118 ("Plaintiffs' cause of action accrued when they demanded and
defendant refused to pay them the monies evidenced in the passbook").
The United States Supreme Court articulated these same basic concepts in United
States v. Wardwell, 172 U. S. 48, 19 S.Ct. 86 (1898). In that case, the plaintiff sued to
recover on three warrants issued by the government to her decedent 24 years earlier that
had never been redeemed. The Treasury refused to pay on the warrants, arguing that the
statute of limitations had run.
The Supreme Court rejected the Treasury's argument, noting that (like savings
accounts), the money had been initially entrusted to the government "for the benefit of the
owner until such time as he shall call for it. This is a continuing promise." Id. at 52.
Absent authority directly on point, the court looked to the law of bank deposits. It first
observed that, under principles of banking law, "[t]he contract to be implied from the
usual course of the business is that the banker shall keep the money until it is called for.
Although it is not strictly a bailment, it partakes in some degree of that character." Id. at
54. See also Real Good Food Store, Inc. v. First National Bank of Oregon, 276 Or. 1057,
557 P.2d 654 (1976) (banks are "bailees" of money deposited with them).
The Supreme Court then noted that, because the "debt" associated with a bank
deposit does not mature until a demand for payment has been made, "the statute [of
limitations] ought not to begin to run, nor should any presumption of payment be allowed
to arise," until such a demand is made. Id. at 55 (emphasis added), quoting Morse, supra.
Continuing its analogy, the court said that a bank deposit is unlike an ordinary debt in this
key respect:
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[T]he liability assumed by receiving a deposit is to pay when actual demand shall
be made. The engagement of a bank with its depositor is not to pay absolutely and
immediately, but when payment shall be required at the banking house. It becomes
a mere custodian, and is not in default or liable to respond in damages until
demand has been made and payment refused. Such are the terms of the contract
implied in the transaction of receiving money on deposit, terms necessary alike to
the depositor and the banker. And it is only because such is the contract that the
bank is not under the obligation of a common debtor to go after its customer and
return the deposit wherever he may be found. Hence it follows that no right of
action exists, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the demand
stipulated for in the contract has been duly made.
Id. at 54 (citation omitted).
The principle that a deposit does not mature as a debt until a demand is made "is
not inconsistent with the proposition laid down by this court . . . to the effect that the
relation between a bank and its depositor is that of debtor and creditor, and nothing
more," the court wrote, "for that proposition throws no light upon the question when the
debt of the debtor becomes due, and when the statute of limitations begins to run." Id. at
55.
In this case, the trial court ruled that the twenty-year presumption of payment
began to run when the funds were deposited in 1971, even though no demand was made
until 2003. That is plainly wrong under Oregon law, and the judgment must be reversed.
B.

The presumption of payment does not apply to savings accounts in any

event.
The Oregon Supreme Court has indicated that presumptions should apply only
when doing so is consistent with their rationale. In the matter of savings accounts,
applying a presumption of payment is neither logical nor consistent with the
underpinnings and development of the doctrine.
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"A presumption is an inference which common sense, enlightened by human
knowledge and experience, draws from the connection, relation, and coincidence of facts
and circumstances with each other." Dencer v. Jory, 131 Or. 653, 284 P. 163, 165
(1930), quoting 22 C.J. 82 (ellipse omitted; emphasis added). In Dencer, for example, the
Oregon Supreme Court recognized that, under that state's law, a presumption of payment
arises when a defendant has in his possession a promissory note upon which a claim is
being made. Nonetheless, rather than automatically apply the presumption, the court
examined the facts surrounding the debt, concluding that its application would not be
appropriate in that particular case. Id. at 165. See also Thompson v. Larsen, 118 Or. 421,
247 P. 139, 141 (1926) (one reason that presumption of payment would not apply was
that debtor was plaintiffs brother-in-law "and he thought he could get his money any
time"; indulgence of a creditor under such circumstances "is not unusual").
Normal societal expectations are for customers to be able to leave money in
savings accounts for long periods of time without having to worry about losing it,
especially when this account was opened in 1971. It is illogical to apply a presumption of
payment under such circumstances. Historical understanding of the presumption does not
support its application "unless the forbearance be unusual, or contrary to what might have
been expected." Kirk v. Smith ex dem. Penn, 22 U. S. 241, 254, 9 Wheat. 241 (1824).
For example, no common law presumption of payment arose in Penn, the court said,
because "it ha[d] been the universal practice to forbear." Id.
It is likewise the "universal practice" to leave money in a savings account for
indefinite periods of time until a demand is made, and no presumption of payment should
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apply to such accounts. In Pagano v. United Jersey Bank, 143 NJ. 220, 760 A.2d 509
(1996), one of the more recent cases to involve a passbook account, the New Jersey
Supreme Court reached the same conclusion.

In Pagano, Rose Guarina deposited

$4,400.00 into the defendant bank's predecessor in 1970, and received a passbook in her
name reflecting the deposit. After Guarina5 s death in 1990, her daughter, Linda Pagano,
discovered the passbook in a dresser drawer. There were no transactions other than the
initial deposit. The bank refused payment, stating that it had no record of the account,
and that the account was presumed paid after 20 years.
The court characterized the issue raised on appeal as "whether the common law
rebuttable presumption of payment after the lapse of twenty years year should be applied
to a passbook-savings account when the issuing bank has no record of the account and
has never stamped or otherwise marked the passbook canceled or closed." Id. at 510. In
answering that question, the court first noted that the presumption of payment is of
decreasing vitality in modem times. Id. at 513-14 ("the common-law presumption of
payment is not being applied even in matters in which it was applied historically"), citing
Wigmore on Evidence § 2517. (It had not been applied in New Jersey since 1939. Most
of Oregon's presumption of payment cases are likewise quite musty.)4
The presumption was not historically applied to bank accounts, the Court further
noted:

Also citing Wigmore, the Oregon Supreme Court noted courts' declining reliance on the
presumption of payment more than 80 years ago. Thompson v. Larsen, 118 Or. 421, 247
P. 139 (1926), quoting 4 Wigmore on Evidence § 2517, p. 3565.
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As Wigmore, supra, § 2517 suggests, and decisional law supports, the commonlaw presumption of payment was not generally recognized in the area of banking.
When the presumption was applied in the earlier cases, banks seldom prevailed
unless they had records to support the claim of payment. Thus when applied, the
presumption did not obviate the need for record retention because a demand for
payment on an old account was frequently supported by reasonable explanations
for the delay.
M a t 514.
Moreover, the presumption of payment "has always been applied by analogy to the
limitations statute," the court noted, and causes of action on deposit accounts for
limitations purposes do not accrue until a demand for payment has been made. Id. at 514.
In light of all the considerations, the court held that the presumption of payment does not
apply to savings accounts.5
The New Jersey Supreme Court had little sympathy for the bank defendant's
complaint that it had chosen to destroy all of its passbook account records, as a result of
which the claim was difficult to defend.

Such claims lack muster, the court said,

especially in the days of computerization:
Before the age of computers, banks could have established and retained a record, if
nothing more than a log book, showing how it closed a passbook-savings account
when a notation to that effect was not placed in the original passbook. Now,
modem technology has made the storage of vast amounts of information at low
cost a common reality.

5

Significantly, there are no cases in Oregon applying the presumption of payment to
bank accounts. See, e.g., Beekman /, supra (unpaid judgment); City of Pendleton v.
Holman, 177 Or. 532, 164 P.2d 434 (1945) (assessment by city for work done); Mason v.
Mason, 148 Or. 34, 34 P.2d 328 (1934) (divorce decree); Wood v. Davin, 122 Or. 74, 257
P. 690 (1927) (contract for sale of land). None of the 19 cases cited in Beekman /, the
case in which Oregon adopted the presumption of payment, involved a bank account.
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M a t 514.
The decision to destroy computer (or microfiche) records is a deliberate choice, the
consequences of which a bank must accept:
We agree with the Supreme Court of Virginia that even if the lack of bank records
is caused by adherence to established record-retention standards, the absence of
records does not constitute evidence of payment. Wool [v. Nations bank of Virginia,
248 Va. 384, 448 S.E.2d 613, 615 (1994)]. Furthermore, no statutes, regulations
or decisional law exempted UJB from retaining records to establish payment. It
was a conscious economic decision made by the bank to shift its resources away
from record retention. That may or may not be a sound business judgment, but
clearly it is insufficient to justify the remedy UJB seeks from this Court.
Id See also Abraham v. National City Bank Corp., 553 N.E. 2d 619, 621 (Ohio 1990)
(opining that "a bank would be foolish to destroy its records" and "leave itself open to
litigation without the documents to defend itself unless it were protected by a statute like
Ohio's that expressly bars subsequent litigation).
The New Jersey Supreme Court's holding in Pagano has been cited by leading
authorities as correctly stating the law relating to the presumption of payment in the
context of savings accounts. See 9 CJ.S. Banks and Banking § 276 ("A rebuttable
presumption of payment, arising from a lapse of twenty years from the date of accrual of
the debt, does not apply to savings accounts"); Michie, supra, § 368c, p. 705 ("A
rebuttable presumption of payment, arising from a lapse of twenty years from the date of
accrual of a debt, if a viable presumption at all, does not apply to savings accounts").6

6

The Oregon Supreme Court would likely consider Michie on Banks and Banking to be
persuasive authority. It has cited Michie as authoritative on banking law in at least 27
cases. See, e.g., Modoc Meat & Cattle Co. v. First State Bank of Oregon, 271 Or. 276,
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
PRESUMPTION HAD NOT BEEN REBUTTED.

THAT

THE

In Oregon, "the presumption [of payment] is rebutted, or, to speak more
accurately, does not arise, where there is affirmative proof, beyond that furnished by the
specialty itself, that the debt has not been paid, or where there are circumstances that
sufficiently account for the delay of the creditor." Beekman II, 25 P. at 672. Even if the
presumption had been applicable, sufficient proof was adduced here.
Evidence that the "debt" had not been paid included:
[T]he passbook shows the deposits and expressly states that withdrawals require
presentation of the passbook. "George B. Handy, Trustee" is the only name
appearing on the passbook. Mr. Handy has not made any withdrawals and has not
authorized any other person to make withdrawals.
(R. 251.) It was also uncontroverted that Mr. Handy did not execute a lost-passbook
affidavit. (T. 26-27, lines 25-5.)
This evidence is similar to that adduced in Central National Bank of McKinney,
557 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1977). In that case, the Texas Civil Court of Appeals
was faced with a presumption of payment defense on a claim for a passbook savings
account. The court summarized the plaintiffs evidence:
The passbook involved in this cause was issued to the plaintiff and had been in the
possession of plaintiff since it was issued and delivered to her in 1932, showing an
initial deposit of $1,000. The plaintiff did not make any additional deposits, did
not make any withdrawals, did not authorize anyone else to make withdrawals, and
was never contacted by the Bank concerning the account. Plaintiff made demand

532 P.2d 21, 25 (1975); U. S. National Bank of Portland v. Stonebrink, 200 Or. 176, 265
P.2d 238, 254 (1954); First National Bank of Portland v. Connolly, 172 Or. 434, 138 P.2d
613,622(1943).
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on defendant Bank for the proceeds of the account in February 1975 (43 years
later).
Finding in favor of the plaintiff, the court stated:
Under the findings of the trial court that plaintiff made no withdrawals, did not
authorize anyone to make withdrawals, made no affidavit of lost passbook, and did
not receive payment of such account, we are of the opinion that any presumption
was rebutted so as to defeat such presumption. A presumption of law, as such, is
not in the nature of evidence and has no probative force, and that when some
evidence of probative nature has been introduced tending to overcome the
presumption, it disappears entirely from the case.
Id. at 565 (citations omitted).

anyone else to do so was uncontroverted.

Although it was theoretically possible for

someone to ha\<- withdrawn the funds without the passbook, ^^
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one person might have been able to sign for a withdrawal, would also have been unusual,
because ordinarily the names of all authorized signers were written on the passbook. Id,

hypothetical scenarios that its own employees testified would have been unusual. I Jnder
these circumstances, and because the Bank's only "evidence" was a presumption, the trial
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the presumption.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, appellant respectfully requests the Court to reverse
the judgment of the trial court, and to remand with instructions to enter judgment in favor
of the plaintiff on the issue of liability, with damages to be determined.
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ntiff, George H j unuv. lound a passbook in his credenza in October, 2003.
This passbook shows five deposits made between July 24 and September 14, 1971
total inr % '• "'•

,!

' "•

•••'•••- ••sted on the passbook is "George B. I landy,

Trustee." The passbook states that it "must be presented when a withdrawal is made."
This passbook shows no withdrawals. Mr. Handy has no idea how this paiI :iilai
passbook came to rest in his credenza and does not know who opened the account or
made the deposits. Plaintiff promptly contacted the Defendant, U.S. Bank National
As.i( i i
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'n;:;.. !\i':.:*.- Mr.

--'aic^ AdUvMUi Sank of

Oregon. Defendant has no record of the account, its depositor, or of its closure. As the
Plaintiff testified, the on.LMI;^ :.•..• t =..
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Plaintiff, acting as trustee, seeks to recover the principal shown in the passbook along
with the accumulated interest. The Court held trial on February 6, 2005. At trial, Prestoii
I landy appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff and Kevin Swenson on behalf of the
Defendant. The Court now finds in favor of the Defendant.

248

Memorandum Decision
no.040901807
1. Defendant's Affirmative Defenses: Escheat and Laches.
Defendant argues that any money in the account would have escheated to the
state. Under Oregon's Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, any deposit with
a bank "is presumed abandoned" unless the owner has taken some action within five
years. Or. Rev. Stat. § 98.308(1) (2003).l Deposits that are presumed abandoned may be
subject to the custody of the State of Oregon. Id. at § 98.304. Escheat would be an
affirmative defense for the Defendant. However, the only evidence at trial was that this
account did not escheat to either Oregon or Utah. The fact that the account could have
escheated or even that it was required to escheat is not sufficient proof that it in fact did
escheat. The Court finds that there is no evidence of escheat and concludes that the
Defendant has not met its burden on this affirmative defense.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs claim is barred by the doctrine of laches.
This affirmative defense requires Defendant to show that (1) Plaintiff delayed asserting
his claim for an unreasonable length of time, (2) with full knowledge of all the relevant
facts, (3) resulting in such substantial prejudice to the Defendant that it would be
inequitable for the Court to grant Plaintiff relief. Bruns v. Walters, 28 P.3d 646 (Or. Ct.
App. 2001). The time begins to run on the Plaintiffs claim when Plaintiff "knew or
reasonably should have known he had an interest which was being threatened." Id. The
Defendant, as the party asserting laches, "has the burden of demonstrating that each
element exists." Myers v. Weems, 876 P.2d 861, 862 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). In this case,
Plaintiff discovered the passbook in October of 2003 and promptly took steps to recover
its stated funds. Plaintiff learned that his interest in the account was being threatened
1

The parties agree that because this account was opened in Oregon, Oregon law should apply. There does
not appear to be any significant difference between the relevant Oregon and Utah laws. However, where
possible the Court will apply Oregon law.
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when the Defendant refused to make payment. The Defendant had the burden to
establish, if possible, some fact or circumstance that would have placed Mr. Handy on
constructive notice that the funds were being threatened sooner than October, 2003.
Defendant has not made that required showing. The Defendant has not proven that
Plaintiff was placed on constructive notice and, therefore, has n.-; .ui UN t ..men to bar
Plaintiff s claim under laches.
2 '

d.
After twenty years, an obligation is presumed to have been paid. Beekman v.

Hamlin, 25 P. 672 (Or. 1891). The presumption of payment from lapse of time applies to
bank deposits. Hicks v. Exck Bank & Trust Co., 478 S.W.2d 54 (Ark. 1972); Long v.
Straus, 24 N.E. 664 (Ind. 1890); Morse v. Natl Cent. Bank, 132 A. 598 (Md. 1926);
Boscowitz v. Chase Nat 7 ,

o2); Second Nat / Bank v.

Thompson, 44 Pa. Super. 200 (1910); Commerce Union Bank v. Horton, 475 S.W.2d 660
(Term. 1972); Blackstone v. First Nt it 7 B« it ik 192 P

-

V< it 7

Bank ofMcKinney, Texas v. Booher, 557 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Owens v.
Bank ofBrewton, 302 So. 2d 114 (Ala. App. 1974); In re Fantozzi, 539 N.E.2d 340 (111.
App. Ct. 1989); (I \ u )/ I \ NationsbankofVa., N. 4., 448 S.E.2d613 (Va 1994),,, But see
Pagano v. United Jersey Bank, 670 A.2d 509 (N.J. 1995) (refusing to extend the

between July 24 and September 14, 1971. Plaintiff had not taken any action on this
account until December 2003—a period of 32 years. Accoi dingly, the Coi n t presi n lies
that the Defendant has paid the deposits.

3
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As a plaintiff, Mr. Handy has the burden to prove his claim, including the
existence of the debt, by a preponderance of the evidence. Additionally, the presumption
of payment from lapse of time, having arisen, places the burden on the Plaintiff to show
that the debt has not been paid.2 Beekman v. Hamlin, 25 P. 672 (Or. 1891); see 69
A.L.R.3d 1311 (1995) (explaining that the common law presumption is an evidentiary
rule placing the burden on the party seeking to recover the debt). The Plaintiff must
show "by competent evidence that the debt... has not been paid." Beekman, 25 P. at
672 (requiring plaintiff "to show by something more than his bond that the debt has not
been paid"). The presumption "is a strong one [and] the evidence to rebut it must be
satisfactory and convincing. . . ." Id. at 673. In this case, the passbook shows the
deposits and expressly states that withdrawals require presentation of the passbook.
"George B. Handy, Trustee" is the only name appearing on the passbook. Mr. Handy has
not made any withdrawals and has not authorized any other person to make withdrawals.
There is no other competent evidence that these deposits have not been paid.
Other courts have considered claims to collect deposits presumed paid by lapse of
time, with some allowing recovery and some holding for the bank. See 69 A.L.R.3d 1311
at §§ 4, 5 (1995). In the majority of cases allowing plaintiffs to recover deposits, the
plaintiff was the depositor and had personal knowledge regarding the opening of the
account. See Cent. Bank ofMcKinney, Texas v. Boohev, 557 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. App.
1977) (allowing depositor to recover balances shown on a passbook issued to her after

2

Defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiffs claim was barred by the presumption of
payment. The Court denied Defendant's motion noting that the passbook was some evidence of
nonpayment. As a motion for summary judgment, the Court viewed that evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. In denying Defendant's motion, the Court did not grant summary
judgment on that issue to the Plaintiff, who had not filed a summary judgment motion of his own. Having
now heard the evidence regarding the passbook, the bank's practices, and the extent of Plaintiff s
knowledge, the Court assigns the passbook what the Court considers to be its appropriate weight.
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43 years where depositor testified that she made no withdrawals); Second Natl Bank v.
Thompson, 44 Pa. Super. 200 (1910) (finding that the presumption was overvorr.. - k>?v
the defendant depositor and his wife testified "emphatically" that they had not been paid).
Among the cases finding the evidence insufficient to recover on a deposit after 20 years,
t

.->•'* '

,!

'

• {'. i »v .

;ie deposits and did not set up the

account. See In re Fantozzi, 539 N.E.2d 340 (111. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that plaintiff
who discovei ed I ler late hi isband's passbo* : .' • • ears atk'

-. ,:*•• i .•-.. i

-r. . t

presented sufficient evidence where plaintiff knew almost nothing regarding her
husband's financial affairs or of the account in question); Owens v Bi ink of Bre i vtt m, 302
So. 2c ; ; * (Ala. App. 1974) (holding that the executor of the account owner, who had no
knowledge of the account other than the information contained in the passbook, had
presented in iiillk ieiil e\ iik'iiecl.
In this case, Plaintiff does not know who opened the account. Plaintiff does not
know who minU ilio deposits n? lioiv die passbook came min his possessing

I I pi MI

opening an account, the bank required its customers to fill out a signature card, A
customer could put different, or more, names on the signature card iv \-

* r ^<^<^k.

A properly authorized person could also withdraw money without the passbook if his
name appeared on the signature card. Neither the Plaintiff nor the Court knows whose
JIV**' ' '

l

' ' c >l;inal1;"
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Bank of Oregon did away with its passbooks. All passbook accounts converted to
statement savings accounts. After the conversion n;i^ho<a

:

v<- ,-M - . » :

' ie

bank told customers to throw their passbooks away. The bank even handed extra
passbooks out to children at schools. After that conversion, the owner of t'»i« <

-nt
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could have withdrawn from the account without the passbook. Neither the Plaintiff nor
the Court knows who else was authorized on the signature card. This would be a very
different case if the Plaintiff had opened the account himself. As is, the Plaintiffs
testimony that he did not authorize any other person to withdraw from the account is
severely discounted by the fact that Plaintiff does not know who created the account or
who else the account owner might have authorized on the signature card. The Court finds
that Plaintiff has not met the burden imposed on him to show that this account has not
been paid.
3. Plaintiff as Trustee.
The name on the passbook is "George B. Handy, Trustee." Although not
dispositive in this case, the Court believes that the status of this "trust" merits attention.
Creating a trust requires more than using the word "trust." One requirement to create a
trust is to have an ascertainable beneficiary. Agan v. United States Nat'I Bank, 363 P.2d
765 (Or. 1961); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 112. Another requirement is that the
settlor impose some affirmative duties on the trustee. Lee v. Me/one, 527 P.2d 414 (Or.
1974); Phillips v. Dep 't of Revenue, 6 Or. Tax. 157 (1975). A trust that imposes no
duties on the trustee is considered "dry." Id. A dry trust fails and the property passes to
the intended beneficiary outright. Id. When a trust fails, the grantee holds the property
under a resulting trust for the benefit of the grantor or the grantor's estate. Restatement
(Second) of Trusts §411. In this case, there is no trust document other than the passbook
itself. Plaintiff does not know who the settlor was, although there is speculation. There
are no ascertainable beneficiaries and the passbook does not impose any affirmative
duties on the Plaintiff In effect, the trust failed at its conception.

6

253

Memorandum Decision
no.040901807
The Court, therefore, finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show by
satisfactory evidence that the debt has not been paid. The Court finds in favor of the
Defendant I Ir. Swenson will please prepare the appropriate findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
Dated tllis

{

V-

day of March, 2006.

W. Brent West, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

v /o

I hereby certify that on the /

day of March, 2006,1 sent a true and correct

copy of the foregoing memorandum decision to counsel as follows:

Michael W. Homer
Kevin D. Swenson
Bret S. Hay man
Counsel for Defendant
SUITTER AXLAND, PLLC
8 East Broadway, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
George B. Handy
Counsel for Plaintiff
2650 Washington Blvd., Suit;
Ogden,UT 84401
Preston L. Handy
Counsel for Plaintiff
5604 South Green Street
Murray, UT 84123
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT

2006HAY-I AMI0« UU

Michael W. Homer (#1535)
Kevin D. Swenson (#5803)
SUITTER AXLAND, PLLC
8 East Broadway, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
Facsimile: (801)532-7355

j p Y 0 1 2006

Attorneys for Defendant U.S. Bank National Association

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE B. HANDY, Trustee,
Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
Case No. 040901807
Judge W. Brent West

Defendant.

This matter came before the court for a bench trial on February 6, 2006. Plaintiff was
represented by Preston L. Handy of Siegfried & Jensen, and defendant was represented by Kevin
D. Swenson of Suitter Axland, PLLC. The court having reviewed the pleadings and testimony,
heard argument in the matter, and hearing the testimony of witnesses at trial, makes the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
: FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

040901807

VD18994524
US BANK NATIONAL ASSOC

S

0

•*'

FINDINGS O F F A C T

1.

Plaintiff, George B. Handy, found a passbook issued by the United States National

Bank of Oregon in his credenza in October 2003.
2.

Prior to October 2003, plaintiff was unaware of the existence of the passbook.

3.

The passbook was identified as Account Number 403111-8 (the "Passbook").

4.

The Passbook showed five (5) deposits made between July 24 and September 14,

5.

The five (5) deposits totaled $150,000.

6.

The Passbook had George B. Handy, Trustee, written on it.

7.

Plaintiff did not know who wrote the name on the Passbook.

8.

The Passbook showed no withdrawals.

9.

Plaintiff had no idea how the Passbook came to rest in his credenza.

10.

Plaintiff did not know who opened Account Number 403111-8 (the "Account") or

1971.

who made the deposits that were shown in the Passbook.
11.

Prior to August 1971, a client of plaintiff had asked if he could put money in

plaintiffs trust account, or a trust account in his name.
12.

Plaintiffdid not make the deposits into the Account.

13.

Plaintiff did not open the Account.

14.

Defendant had no record of this Account.

15.

Plaintiffdid not know who was authorized to take money out of the Account.
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5?
16.

The express terms of the Passbook required the presentation of the Passbook for

withdrawals.
17.

A Signature Card is required to open every Account.

18.

Plaintiff did not sign a Signature Card for the Account.

19.

There is no evidence that the Account escheated to any State.

20.

Plaintiff did not take any action on this matter until December 2003.

21.

In the Fall of 1980, the United States National Bank of Oregon did away with its

passbook accounts. All passbook accounts were converted to statement savings accounts.
22.

Plaintiff did not receive notice of the change to statement savings accounts.

23.

Plaintiff did not receive any correspondence from defendant regarding the

Account.
24.

Defendant did not have any records of the Account.

25.

After the conversion to statement savings accounts, passbooks became worthless.

26.

After the conversion to statement savings accounts, bank representatives told

customers they could throw their passbooks away.
27.

Plaintiff presented no evidence of a trust having in fact been created with regard

to this Passbook Account.
28.

There was no ascertainable beneficiary identified for the alleged trust associated

with the Passbook Account.

260

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant did not meet his burden of proof on the affirmative defense that the

funds in the Passbook had escheated to any State.
2.

Defendant did not meet his burden of proof that the plaintiff had been on

constructive notice prior to October 2003 regarding the existence of the Passbook; therefore, it
did not meet his burden that plaintiffs claims were barred by the doctrine of laches.
3.

Based on Oregon law, after 20 years, an obligation is presumed to have been paid.

4.

The presumption of payment from lapse of time applies to bank deposits.

5»

The court finds that there is a presumption that the defendant has paid the

deposits.
6.

Plaintiff has the burden to prove his claim, including the existence of the debt, by

a preponderance of the evidence.
7.

Plaintiff has the burden to show that the debt has not been paid.

$.

Plaintiff must make this showing that the debt has been paid "by competent

evidence that the debt... has not been paid."
9.

Plaintiff had no evidence other than his own testimony that he did not withdraw

the money or authorize anyone else to withdraw the money to show that the deposits had not
been paid.
10.

Plaintiff did not meet the burden imposed upon him to show that this Account has

not been paid.

4

11.

The court finds that because plaintiff has failed to meet his burden in his case, his

claim must fail.
12.

Judgment in this matter is for the defendant, finding no cause of action.

13.

Plaintiff filed a request for attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-

56. Section 78-27-56 allows for attorneys' fees to a prevailing party if the "court determines that
the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith."
14.

In this case, plaintiff was not the prevailing party and there is no showing that the

defense was brought in bad faith, as shown by the fact that the defendant was the prevailing party
in this case.
15.

Plaintiffs motions for attorneys' fees are accordingly denied.

DATED this 2S~ day of April, 2006.
BY THE COURT:

W. Brent West
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM
AND«£QNTENT:
/?

[Attormysfaf-Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ^LO day of April, 2006,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be deposited in the
United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid to:
Preston L. Handy, Esq.
5664 South Green Street
Murray, UT 84123
Attorney for Plaintiff
George B. Handy, Attorney
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 102
Ogden,UT 84401
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UNITEO STATES
NATIONAL. BANK
OF OREGON
HEAD OFFICE • PORTLAND

N©TlpE
It is not necessary to bring your pass
book on interest payment dates for
the entry of interest. Interest has been
added to your account on our books
by these dates and can be entered in
your pass book at any time thereafter.
United States National Bank of Oregon
Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
2-33

2-65
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ABOUT YOUR
SAVINGS
ACCOUNT
For your protection, all withdrawals from this account require
presentation ot the passbook. Please
notify us at once should you lose
your passbook.
Your signature is important. Be
sure to sign your name each time
just as you did in opening the
account.
Please notify us of any change
of address.
It is not necessary to bring in
your passbook on the first of each
quarter for the entry of interest.
We credit your account automatically with your interest on these
dates and it can be entered in your
passbook at any time thereafter.

UNITED STATES
NATIONAL BANK
OF OREGON
HEAD OFFICE • PORTLAND

HEAD O F F I C E
S. W . B R O A D W A Y A N D S I X T H
AT S T A R K S T .

"Success Begins
With Saving"
Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

RULES

AND

ING

REGULATIONS

J

(ASSIGNMElSfrT OF ACCOUNT)

i
|

Rule 3. No assignment of the depositor's
passbook or account, or any part thereof,
shall be Valid unless made in writing, aha
shall not bind the Bank until it has been
filed with the Bank in writing.

GOVERN-

SAVINGS ACCOUNTS

DEPOSITOR AND BANK AGREE:
1
Rule 1. All savings deposits are received
by United States National Bank of Oregon
subject to rules and regulations as printed
J
herein; as shown on Bank's deposit and
other forms; and as changed from time ,
J
to time by posting of notice in Bank's lobby.
I
.Acceptance of this passbook, and inscription
pf name 'by depositor or agent oh signature ; I
card required by the Bank, shall be deemed
I
and held to be a valid assent thereto,
J
\
(THE SAVINGS PASSBOOK)
I
I
Rule 2. A pre-numbered passbook shall be
j
issued for each savings account. All deposits
made by or for the account of the depositor
I
will be entered in the passbook at the time
they are made, or as soon thereafter
as the
:
1
passbbojc shall>Jb^ presented ^fbr such purl
pose. The balance shown in the passbook to
/:
the credit 62 the depositor is subject to cor}'
rection to accord with the Bank's records.
I
K
Should the savings passbook be lost, deI
stroyed orfraudulently obtained from any
}
depositor, immediate notice must be given
f
the Office of the Bank at which the account
is carried. After such notice, if satisfactory
j
explanation be made and bond Of indemnity
be given in a form approved by the Bank's
1
6ffleers, the amount to the credit of the
1
depositor will be paid to such depositor, or
f
a n e w book will be issued therefor.
|

(DEPOSITS)
Rule 4. Deposits will be received of any
sum from one dollar to such maximum
amount as may from time to time be designated by the Bank.
.•; •
Items are credited conditionally at time of
deposit and may be forwarded On next business date after receipt. Bank may charge
back any item before ultimate payment, ineluding items drawn on this Bank; it is not
liable for losses i i transit; and it may decline to honor withdrawals against conditional credits. Depositor is bound by all
clearing house and/or Federal Reserve collection rules and practices.
The Bank may decline to receive any deposit and at any time may require depositor
to withdrav/ all or part of the funds on
deposit. Notice thereof will be mailed to the
depositor by first class mail at his last address on file with the Bank. Interest shall
cease pii such dep >sit or part of deposit
for
Which withdrawal Is required after5 thirty
days frbm date of such notice.
(DEPOSITS P F MINORS)
Rule 5. Deposits made by any person or
persons for or in the name of any minor
shall be made and received upon the express condition that the Bank nfay pay out

0
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such deposit or part thereof only upon the
written order of the minor.
Deposits made by any person or persons
In trust for any minor shall be made and
received upon the express condition that
the Bank during the lifetime of the depositor may pay out such deposit or part thereof only upon the written order of the
person or persons who made the deposit in
trust for the minor.
(WITHDRAWALS)
Rule 6. The passbook must be presented
to the Bank when a withdrawal is made.
Withdrawals may be made personally, the
depositor being required to sign a receipt
for the amount of the withdrawal, or by
order in writing satisfactorily authenticated,
or by power of attorney, duly authenticated.
It is understood and agreed that the Bank
may require, whenever in the opinion of
any of the officers, it may be deemed advisable, written notices of the intention of any
depositor to withdraw as follows:
Thirty days' notice to withdraw any
sum up to $100; sixty days* notice to
withdraw any sum from $100 to $500;
ninety days' notice to withdraw any
sum from $500 to $1,000; four months'
notice td withdraw any sum from $1,000
to $3,000; six months' notice to withdraw any sum over $3,000.
A second notice of withdrawal will not be
accepted until the first notice has expired
or been cancelled. Failure to demand payment at the Bank within five days after the
expiration of the notice shall be constituted
a waiver of such notice arid a new notice
may be required.

:
\
i
*

(INTEREST)
Rule 7. Interest will be allowed and paid
on savings' accounts on such terms and conditions and at such rates and on such balances as may, from time to time be designated by the Banfc or is limited by the
Federal Reserve Board oi other legally constituted authority.
. . .

L
I
J,
'

(SERVICE CHARGES)
Rule 8. All savings accounts, whether active or inactive, shall be subject to service
charges now or hereafter in effect.

i

(AMENDMENTS)
Rule 9. These rules, conditions and regulations may be altered or amended, ,and
new ones made by the Sank at any time,
but no alterations or ariendments or new
rules, regulations or conditions shall be in
force until notice thereof shall have been
posted in the Bank lobby for at least thirty
days. Such posting shall be held to be a
personal notice to each depositor.
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U. S. NATIONAL
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Bank Drafts and Money Orders
Bank by Mail
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International Banking Department
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Safe Deposit Boxes .
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Checking Accounts

Christmas Club
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Complete Trust Service

Personal and Business Loans
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